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DETECTING EVASIVE MALICIOUS URL USING GRAPH ALGORITHM 
 
Introduction 
 The present disclosure provides systems and methods to enable inspecting of byte 
streams using a bipartite match algorithm to detect the use of evasive techniques to defeat 
Uniform Resource Locator (URL) filtering or filtering of other Uniform Resource Identifiers 
(URI).  Generally, URL filtering is one of the primary methods used to detect cyber threats.  
However, the URL specification (e.g., as set forth in RFC 3986) is quite flexible and can allow 
malicious actors to use evasive techniques to defeat algorithms used in URL filtering 
technologies.  The conventional way to inspect byte streams, in particular for web traffic, often 
uses automata (e.g., Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA), Nondeterministic Finite Automaton 
(NFA)) or regular expression (regex)).  These methods generally work well when the regex is 
relatively "simple," but when evasive techniques are used, automata is less effective.  The 
systems and methods of the present disclosure can provide for inspecting byte streams using a 
bipartite match algorithm.  Effectively, the token can be kept simple, and the complexity of the 
pattern (formed using the token) can be expressed using bipartite match terminology. 
Summary 
According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic programming 
algorithm is provided to enable inspecting of byte streams to detect use of evasive techniques to 
defeat Uniform Resource (URL) filtering.  This algorithm matches signatures once and only once 
just like DFA in the first stage, and uses polynomial runtime to select a matching pattern in the 
second stage. 
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Detailed Description 
The systems and methods of the present disclosure can provide for inspecting byte 
streams using a bipartite match algorithm.  According to an aspect of the present disclosure, the 
token can be kept simple, and the complexity of the pattern (formed using the token) can be 
expressed using bipartite match terminology.  The pattern is a sequence of tokens.  (Note that a 
token can match to multiple signatures.) 
The tokens in the pattern are adjacent and their order of appearance is significant, these 
two factors are implicitly inconvenient for describing collections of signatures where order or 
continuity (e.g., a pattern “abc” where a, b, and c are tokens and there are no other tokens in the 
pattern) or both are not the matching criteria.  The above can be difficult and/or expensive to 
execute, even not possible, in DFA, as well as NFA when compounded with signature 
polymorphism.  From the first principle, this is a combinatorial pattern matching problem. 
According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic programming 
algorithm and related data structure is provided as an alternative to DFA.  This algorithm 
matches signatures once and only once just like DFA in the first stage, and uses polynomial 
runtime to select a matching pattern in the second stage. 
According to an example implementation of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic 
programming algorithm comprises the following operations.  Conceptually, in compile time, the 
patterns are compiled into an n*m binary matrix plus one additional column to describe the 
modifiers, where n is the number of patterns and m is the number of unique tokens used in the 
patterns.  The tokens are compiled into DFA as usual (e.g., partitioned per URL host + path 
using a trie data structure) such that e(i,j)=1 if and only if the ith pattern has the jth token.  In the 
first stage of runtime, first an n*m binary matrix is built where n is the number of tokens 
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matched against the DFA (e.g., tokens are obtained from protocol/URL parsing phase) and m is 
the number of tokens such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth token.  Note 
that the ith row can have multiple columns set to true.  In the second stage of runtime, the sub 
runtime n*m matrix is obtained for a particular pattern such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the  ith 
token matches the jth tokens in the pattern.  A bipartite graph is equivalent to a matrix, therefore, 
a bipartite graph can be built where there are two sets of vertex, n and m, where n is token and m 
is signature.  There is a weight 1 edge between an ith vertex in n and an nth vertex in m if e(i,j) in 
the matrix is true. 
The necessary condition for a pattern match is the bipartite graph's maximum bipartite 
matching or max flow equals to m, the number of tokens in the pattern.  This can be proven using 
the definition of maximum bipartite matching/max flow, which will be called Raven Pattern 
Matching Theorem L herein.  It can be further proven that Theorem L is not only the necessary 
but also the sufficient condition for patterns who have both orderfree and continuityfree 
modifiers.  
When patterns have only the orderfree modifier, there is a need to additionally check that 
it is continuous max flow.  The FordFulkerson algorithm (FFA) and its variants can be used to 
determine the max flow number in O(Ef). 
Function FFA 
for each edge (u,v) in E(G) 
do f[u, v] = 0 f[v, u] = 0 while there is a path p from s to t in the residual network Gf 
do m = min{c(u, v)-f[u, v]: (u, v) is on p} for each edge (u, v) on p 
do f[u, v] = f[u, v] + m f[v, u] = - f[u, v] 
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FFA can be overkill since it deals with general graphs, whereas the HopcroftKarp 
algorithm (HKA) is an example of a max flow algorithm for bipartite graphs.  It runs in 
O(E*sqrt(V)), and for random graphs, it runs in near linear time.  For sparse graphs, HKA can 
provide better results in worst case performance. 
Function HKA 
for each u in U 
Pair_U[u] = NIL for each v in V 
Pair_V[v] = NIL matching = 0 while BFS() == true 
for each u in U 
if Pair_U[u] == NIL 
if DFS(u) == true 
matching = matching + 1 
return matching 
It can be proven that if and only if the diagonals of the sub square m*m matrix are all 
true, then it matches a pattern who has neither orderfree nor continuityfree.  A naive algorithm 
can determine the above in O(nm).  A KnuthMorrisPratt style algorithm can be used to speed this 
up. 
Finally, it can be proven that the runtime is O(n) for patterns that have only 
continuityfree. 
All four combinations of orderfree and continuityfree therefore have polynomial runtime 
complexity or better.   
In conclusion, just like DFA is the mathematical model for regex, bipartite graph is a 
good mathematical model to represent pattern. 
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For combinatorial analysis, the problem space is roughly P(k, n) * C(k, m) for k = 1…n  
O(Ef) where E is the number of edges, f is max flow.  When orderfree and continuityfree are 
both specified in the pattern, it is better to specify the max number of parameters in order to have 
the algorithm be bounded, the same for matching the signatures in the first stage. 
Figure 1 depicts an example system 100 according to an implementation of the present 
disclosure.  Figure 1 illustrates one example computing system that can be used to implement the 
present disclosure.  Other computing systems can be used as well.  The system 100 may 
comprise one or more user computing devices, such as user computing device 102, one or more 
firewalls, such as firewall 130, one or more filtering server computing systems, such as filtering 
server computing system 140, and one or more web servers, such as web server(s) 160, coupled 
over one or more networks, such as network 180.   
The user computing device 102 can include one or more processors 104 and a memory 
106.  The one or more processors 104 can be any suitable processing device and can be one 
processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected.  The memory 106 can 
include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage mediums, such as RAM, ROM, 
EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof.  The 
memory 106 can store data 108 and instructions 110 which are executed by the processor 104 to 
cause the first computing device 102 to perform operations.   
The user computing device 102 can also include one or more input/output interface(s) 
116.  One or more input/output interface(s) 116 can include, for example, devices for receiving 
information from or providing information to a user, such as a display device, touch screen, 
touch pad, mouse, data entry keys, an audio output device such as one or more speakers, a 
microphone, haptic feedback device, etc.  The user computing device 102 can also include one or 
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more communication/network interface(s) 118 used to communicate with one or more systems or 
devices, including systems or devices that are remotely located from the user computing device 
102.   
 According to an aspect of the present disclosure, the user computing device 102 can send 
requests to and receive responses from one or more web servers, such as web server(s) 160.  The 
requests and responses can be processed through one or more firewalls, such as firewall 130, for 
example, to protect the user computing device 102 from malicious actors.  The firewall 130 can 
communicate with filtering server computing system 140 to perform URL filtering as discussed 
herein.   
The filtering server computing device 140 can include one or more processors 142 and a 
memory 144.  The one or more processors 142 can be any suitable processing device and can be 
one processor or a plurality of processors that are operatively connected.  The memory 144 can 
include one or more non-transitory computer-readable storage mediums, such as RAM, ROM, 
EEPROM, EPROM, flash memory devices, magnetic disks, etc., and combinations thereof.  The 
memory 144 can store data 146 and instructions 148 which are executed by the processor 142 to 
cause the filtering server computing device 140 to perform operations, for example, to 
implement operations as discussed herein.  The filtering server computing device 140 may 
include one or more URL filtering systems 150 that can assist in identifying and/or filtering 
invalid and/or malicious URL requests and/or responses.  The URL filtering systems 150 can 
include a bipartite matching subsystem 152 which can provide operations for malicious URL 
filtering as discussed herein.  
Figure 2 depicts a flowchart illustrating example operations 200 for inspecting of byte 
streams using a bipartite match algorithm in accordance with aspects of the present disclosure.  
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Although operations 200 are shown and described in a particular order for purposes of 
illustration and discussion, the operations are not limited to the particularly illustrated order or 
arrangement and certain operations can be performed in different orders or simultaneously.    
The operations begin at block 202 where patterns are compiled into an n*m binary matrix 
plus one additional column to describe the modifiers, where n is the number of patterns and m is 
the number of unique tokens used in the patterns.     
At block 204, the signatures are compiled into DFA as usual (e.g., partitioned per URL 
host + path using a trie data structure) such that e(i,j)=1 if and only if the ith pattern has the jth 
token. 
At block 206, in the first stage of runtime, an n*m binary matrix is built where n is the 
number of tokens matched against the DFA and m is the number of signatures such that 
e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth token.    
At block 208, in the second stage of runtime, the sub runtime n*m matrix is obtained for 
a particular pattern such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token matches the jth tokens in the 
pattern.   
At block 210, a bipartite graph is built having two sets of vertex, n and m, where n is 
token and m is signature.  There is a weight 1 edge between an ith vertex in n and an nth vertex 
in m if e(i,j) in the matrix is true.  
At block 212, indication(s) can be provided for malicious URL(s) that are identified such 
that appropriate response measures can be performed.  
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Abstract 
The present disclosure describes systems and methods to enable inspecting of byte 
streams using a bipartite match algorithm to detect use of evasive techniques to defeat Uniform 
Resource (URL) filtering.  According to an aspect of the present disclosure, a two stage dynamic 
programming algorithm is provided that matches signatures once and only once just like DFA in 
the first stage, and uses polynomial runtime to select a matching pattern in the second stage.  
According to an example implementation of the present disclosure, the patterns are compiled into 
an n*m binary matrix plus one additional column to describe the modifiers, where n is the 
number of patterns and m is the number of unique signatures used in the patterns.  In the first 
stage of runtime, an n*m binary matrix is built where n is the number of tokens matched against 
the DFA and m is the number of signatures such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the ith token 
matches the jth signature.  In the second stage of runtime, the sub runtime n*m matrix is obtained 
for a particular pattern such that e(i,j)=true if and only if the  ith token matches the jth signatures 
in the pattern.  A bipartite graph can be built where there are two sets of vertex, n and m, where n 
is token and m is signature.  There is a weight 1 edge between an ith vertex in n and an nth vertex 
in m if e(i,j) in the matrix is true. 
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